Nuclear Guardrails Vanish: Russia Unleashed

For the first time in more than 50 years, America is heading into a world where Russia can expand its strategic nuclear arsenal with no binding treaty limits.

Story Snapshot

New START, the last U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty limiting deployed strategic weapons, expires Feb. 4–5, 2026 with no replacement.
Russia suspended participation in 2023 (inspections and data exchange), and now says it is “no longer bound” after expiration.
Putin floated a one-year voluntary extension in 2025; Trump said it “sounds like a good idea,” but talks did not materialize.
Without verification measures, both countries lose transparency into the other’s deployed forces, raising miscalculation risks.
Analysts warn the end of New START could accelerate a costly arms race and complicate global nonproliferation diplomacy ahead of the NPT review cycle.

New START Expiration Ends Enforceable Limits

New START entered into force in 2011 and capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers), and 800 total launchers. Those ceilings mattered not just for the numbers, but because they came with inspections and data exchanges that let both sides verify compliance. With the treaty expiring on Feb. 4–5, 2026, those legal constraints disappear without a successor agreement.

Russia’s position is straightforward: it says it is no longer bound once New START expires. Moscow had already suspended its participation in 2023, halting inspections and certain transparency measures while indicating it would continue observing numerical limits for a period. The United States responded with reciprocal steps, leaving the treaty functioning in name but hollow in practice. Now the treaty’s end formalizes what the suspension began: a strategic environment with fewer guardrails.

How the Biden Era Left Trump a Dead-End Framework

The road to expiration was paved by years of breakdown. The Biden administration did extend New START in early 2021 to 2026, but the relationship deteriorated sharply after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the broader U.S.-NATO response. In February 2023, Russia announced it was suspending participation, blaming U.S. and allied actions. Since then, the verification backbone—on-site inspections and data exchange—has remained frozen, undermining the treaty’s practical value even before the clock ran out.

In September 2025, Putin proposed a one-year continuation of the treaty’s limits on a voluntary basis, and President Trump publicly indicated the idea sounded acceptable. Yet reporting indicates the proposal went nowhere amid U.S. silence and a lack of follow-through. That matters because arms control, like any contract, requires active maintenance. When neither side is willing to negotiate verification, definitions, and enforcement mechanisms, “limits” become political talking points rather than binding security instruments.

What the U.S. Loses Without Inspections and Data

The biggest near-term change is not necessarily an immediate surge in warheads, but the loss of reliable insight. New START’s inspections and notifications were designed to reduce worst-case assumptions by providing routine, legally required transparency. Without them, U.S. planners must lean more heavily on national technical means and inference, which can fuel suspicion in a crisis. In nuclear strategy, uncertainty is expensive—and dangerous—because it pressures both sides to prepare for the most threatening scenario.

Several analyses highlight “upload” capacity: both countries maintain non-deployed warheads that could be added to existing missiles, potentially increasing deployed numbers faster than building entirely new systems. Research cited in this briefing indicates Russia could increase by roughly 60% and the U.S. could increase by roughly 110% under certain assumptions about available warheads and delivery configurations. Exact timelines depend on readiness and logistics, but the broader point stands: the capability to scale up exists.

Costs, Deterrence, and the Constitutional Stakes at Home

For American taxpayers, an unconstrained strategic competition can translate into budget pressure. Modernization of the nuclear triad was already underway, and a looser arms-control environment can increase demands for additional warheads, delivery systems, missile defenses, and industrial capacity. Analysts also connect this moment to U.S. missile defense debates, which Russia has long criticized. Any serious response will require clear congressional oversight—because long-term deterrence strategy has real tradeoffs for spending and national priorities.

Politically, the end of New START lands during a period when many conservatives are demanding a return to realism: strong defense, fewer illusions, and less dependence on international “process” without enforcement. At the same time, nothing about strategic arms control should be confused with surrender. The core conservative interest is protecting Americans while limiting bureaucratic overreach and waste. If future talks emerge, verification and accountability—rather than vague promises—will be the make-or-break test.